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Abstract
Consider the problem of exact Nash Implementation of social choice
correspondences. Dene a lottery mechanism as a mechanism in which
the planner can randomize on alternatives out of equilibrium while
pure alternatives are always chosen in equilibrium. When prefer-
ences over alternatives are strict, we show that Maskin monotonicity
(Maskin, 1999) is both necessary and su¢ cient for a social choice cor-
respondence to be Nash implementable. We discuss how to relax the
assumption of strict preferences. Next, we examine social choice cor-
respondences with private components. Finally, we apply our method
to the issue of voluntary implementation (Jackson and Palfrey, 2001).
Keywords: Lottery mechanism, Nash implementation, no-veto power,
Maskin monotonicity.
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1 Introduction
The goal of implementation theory is to design institutions that eliminate
strategic manipulations, on part of the agents, in order to implement desir-
able social choice correspondences (henceforth SCCs). Maskin monotonicity
(Maskin, 1999) is a necessary condition for (exact) Nash implementation.
When there are at least three players, it is also su¢ cient if coupled with the
assumption of no-veto power.1 In economic environments with a perfectly
divisible good (e.g. money), where there is typically conict of interest, no-
veto power is vacuously satised since agents will never agree on a best
alternative. For more general environments, the gap between necessity and
su¢ ciency was closed by Moore and Repullo (1990), Sjöström (1991) and
Danilov (1992), among others.2 The necessary and su¢ cient condition is
complex and may be hard to interpret.
We suggest closing the gap between necessity and su¢ ciency by looking
at a di¤erent class of mechanisms than the canonical one used in Maskin
(1999). We call it the class of lottery mechanisms. While equilibrium mes-
sages should still deliver (pure) alternatives selected by the SCC, we allow
the planner to use non-degenerate lotteries out of equilibrium. We construct
an alternative version of the canonical mechanism in which agents can ob-
tain a lottery on two alternatives for some message proles. Unlike in Maskin
(1999), preferences of agents should also be extended to preference over lot-
teries. A consequence is that, under some assumptions on the environment,
every Maskin monotonic SCC is Nash implementable by a lottery mecha-
nism. The Theorem closes the gap between Maskin monotonicity and Nash
implementability. It does not require agents to have preferences satisfying
the Von-Neumann and Morgenstern axioms.
In an independent study, Benoit and Ok (2004) address the same question.
The mechanism they use belongs to our class of lottery mechanisms. They
show that if there are at least three agents and the set of top alternatives is a
1No-veto power states that if at least n   1 agents agree on a best alternative at a
preference prole, it should be selected by the SCC at that prole. This condition is
restrictive. For example, the individually rational SCC, both in problems of indivisible
goods assignment and in voting settings, fail to satisfy it.
2Danilov (1992) derives an elegant necessary and su¢ cient condition for Nash imple-
mentation in the case of linear orders on alternatives called essential monotonicity. In
such an environment, his condition is equivalent to the condition of Moore and Repullo
(1990) or Sjöström (1991).
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singleton for at least two agents, then any unanimous andMaskin monotonic
SCC is implementable by a lottery mechanism.3
In the main theorem, for simplicity, we restrict our attention to linear
orderings over (pure) alternatives. Next, we rst discuss how we can easily
relax the assumption of strict preferences. The domain restriction we intro-
duce is top strict di¤erence. It says that if an alternative is ranked top by
at least (n  1) agents, then the set of top alternatives should be a singleton
for at least two agents. Moreover, our result does not require that the SCC
be unanimous. Second, we examine cases where alternatives are vectors with
private components, an issue not covered by Benoit and Ok (2004).4 Finally,
we consider the case of voluntary implementation (Jackson and Palfrey, 2001)
and show that their h-no-veto power axiom can also be dispensed with by
considering a lottery mechanism.
2 The set-up
There is a xed nite set of agents N  f1; :::; ng, with n  3, and a xed
nite set of alternatives A, with jAj  `  2. Let L  ` 1 be the set
of lotteries over A. In lottery x = (xa)a2A 2 L; alternative a occurs with
probability xa. Abusing notation, we write a both for the pure alternative
a 2 A and for the lottery x 2 L with xa = 1. The support of a lottery
x 2 L is the set of pure alternatives receiving a strictly positive probability
in x : suppx  fa 2 A j xa > 0g :
The set of admissible preference proles over A and over L are, respec-
tively,  and  . For any  2 , Ri() stands for the (weak) preference of
agent i 2 N over alternatives in A; that is, Ri () is a complete and transi-
tive binary relation. We denote by Pi() and Ii() the associated strict and
indi¤erence binary relations, respectively. Similarly, dene for any  2  ,
Ri(); Pi() and Ii() in the same fashion. Given  2 , let ()    be
the set of preferences over L that agree on the ranking over A. We make two
assumptions on preferences.
Strictness: For each  2 , each a; b 2 A and each i 2 N , if aRi()b, then
aPi()b or a = b.
3They also discuss implementation using mechanisms with awards and implementation
with a renegotation function.
4E.g., the assignment of indivisible goods without monetary transfers, matching prob-
lems, etc...
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Monotonicity in probabilities: Preferences over lotteries are monotonic
in probabilities, that is, shifts in probability to strictly preferred alternatives
yield strictly preferred lotteries. For each i 2 N; and each k 2 f1; : : : ; `g, let
pik : ! A be dened by
pik () = a () jfb 2 A j bRi () agj = k.
That is, pi1 () is the preferred alternative of agent i at prole ; pi2 () her
second preferred alternative, etc. Then, if two lotteries x  (xa)a2A and
y  (ya)a2A are such that for each k 2 f1; :::; `g ;
P
kk
xpik() 
P
kk
ypik(),
then xRi()y for any  2 (), and whenever at least one such inequality is
strict, then xPi()y for all  2  ().
Denote by LCi(; a) the lower contour set of agent i 2 N at prole  2 
and alternative a 2 A, i.e.,
LCi(; a)  fb 2 A : aRi()bg .
For each  2 , and each i 2 N , let TOPi()  fa 2 A : aRi () b for each b 2 Ag.
A social choice correspondence is a mapping f :   A that associates
to each preference prole a non-empty subset of alternatives.
Unanimity: A SCC f is unanimous if and only if for each pair (a; ) 2
A,
[aRi()b for each i 2 N and each b 2 A] =) [a 2 f()].
Notice that unanimity is implied by no-veto power, dened next.
No-Veto power: A SCC f satises no-veto power if and only if for each
pair (a; ) 2 A, and each i 2 N ,
[aRj()b for each j 6= i and each b 2 A] =) [a 2 f()].
Maskin monotonicity: A SCC f is Maskin monotonic (Maskin, 1999)
if and only if for each pair (; ) 2 2 and each a 2 f(),
[LCi(; a)  LCi(; a) for each i 2 N ] =) [a 2 f()] .
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For each agent i 2 N , each  2 , and each a 2 A, dene
Ci(; a) 

c 2 LCi (; a) : for all  2 , if LCi(; a)  LCi(; c) and,
for each j 6= i; LCj(; c) = A, then c 2 f().

Strong monotonicity: A SCC f is strongly monotonic if and only if for
each pair (; ) 2 2 and a 2 f(),
[Ci(; a)  LCi(; a) for each i 2 N ] =) [a 2 f()] .5
A deterministic mechanism (or game form) is a pair G = (M; g) where
M  
i2N
Mi, (Mi is the message space of agent i 2 N) and g : M ! A is an
outcome function that associates an alternative to every prole of messages.
A mechanismG is a lottery mechanism if for each  2  and eachm 2M ,
g(m) 2 L. Hence, g : M ! L: That is, any outcome of the mechanism is
a lotterywhether this lottery is degenerate or non-degenerate. Because our
focus is on exact implementation of deterministic SCCs, the Nash equilibrium
outcomes of the mechanism should be degenerate lotteries. Let G be the class
of lottery mechanisms.
A game forG is a pair (G; ) for some  2  :We will restrict our attention
to pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game (G; ), denoted NE (G; ) : A
lottery mechanism G = (M; g) is ordinal if the set of Nash equilibria only
depends on agentspreferences over pure alternatives; that is, for each  2 ,
each m 2 M and all ;  2 (), NE (G; ) = NE (G; ). We conne
our attention to ordinal game forms. Therefore, abusing notation, for any
 2  () ; let NE (G; ) denote the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game
(G; ) :
A SCC f is Nash implementable via a lottery mechanism if there exists
a mechanism G 2 G such that the Nash equilibrium outcomes of each game
coincides with the outcomes chosen by f . That is, for each  2  and each
 2  (), f () = g (NE (G; )).
3 Enlarging the Class of Mechanisms
To understand why enlarging the class of admissible mechanisms could help
dispensing with the no-veto power assumption, it is useful to recall Maskins
5When strictness is satised, the essential monotonicity condition of Danilov (1992)
coincides with strong monotonicity.
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Theorem 3 (Maskin, 1999) and his canonical mechanism. The necessity of
Maskin monotonicity for Nash implementation with deterministic mecha-
nisms is omitted from the Theorem statement because the su¢ ciency part
is the focus of our paper.
Theorem 1 (Maskin, 1999) If n  3, any Maskin monotonic SCC that
satises no-veto power is Nash implementable via a deterministic mechanism.
Proof : For each i 2 N , let Mi  A    N. A typical message is
mi  (m1i ;m2i ;m3i )  (a; ; n). The outcome function is described as follows.
Rule 1 : If mi = (a; ; ) for all i 2 N and a 2 f(), then g(m) = a.
Rule 2 : If for some i 2 N , mj = (a; ; ) for each j 6= i, a 2 f() and
mi = (b; ; ) with (b; ) 6= (a; ), then the outcome is
g(m) =

b if b 2 LCi(; a)
a otherwise
Rule 3 : In all other cases, the outcome ism1i, where i
  min fi 2 N : ni  nj 8j 2 Ng :
The proof of Theorem 1 is well-known, but we sketch it here for the sake
of completeness.
Suppose that the true state is  2 . We have di¤erent cases to consider.
1) g(m) is given by Rule 3.
Note that any agent j 6= i could obtain his top-ranked outcome by an-
nouncing nj > ni. If g(m) is a Nash equilibrium outcome of the mechanism,
then LCi(; g(m)) = A for each i 2 N . By no-veto power, g(m) 2 f().
2) g(m) is given by Rule 2.
Note that any agent j 6= i could deviate, trigger the integer game and
obtain his top-ranked outcome, say a, by announcing nj > nk for all k 6= j. If
g(m) is a Nash equilibrium outcome, then LCj(; g(m)) = A for each j 6= i.
By no-veto power, g(m) 2 f().
3) g(m) is given by Rule 1.
If  is announced truthfully, then g(m) 2 f(). So, suppose instead that
mi = (a; ; ) and a 2 f(). Any agent i could deviate and obtain any
alternative b such that b 2 LCi(; a). If g(m) is a Nash equilibrium outcome,
then for each i 2 N , aRi()b =) aRi()b. By Maskin monotonicity,
a 2 f().
6
To conclude the proof, suppose the true state is  2  and x a 2
f(). We show that each agent i 2 N reporting mi = (a; ; 0) form a Nash
equilibrium of the mechanism with respect to . Given m = (mi)i2N , Rule 1
applies and the outcome is a 2 f(). Any agent j 2 N can trigger rule 2 by
announcing mj = (b; ; ) and obtain b 2 LCj(; a). By the denition of the
lower contour set, such a deviation cannot be protable. Therefore, m is a
Nash equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Note that in the proof, no-veto power is in fact used only to rule out unde-
sirable equilibria in Rule 2. In Rule 3, only unanimityobviously implied by
no-veto poweris needed. What happens if no-veto power is not satised?6
Suppose that the true state is  and that messages reported are for each
j 6= i, mj = (a; ; ) with a 2 f () ; and mi = (c; ; ) with c 2 LCi (; a).
The outcome is g(m) = c given by Rule 2. If no-veto power is not satised
and (c; ) 6= (a; ), it could be the case that for each j 6= i, LCj (; c) = A,
LCi(; a)  LCi (; c) and c =2 f(). In such a case, no protable deviations
from m are possible: any agent j 6= i could trigger the integer game but
c is top-ranked for any such agent. Furtermore, by changing his message,
agent i can only obtain an outcome in LCi (; a), which can be no better
than c according to Ri (). Thus, message m is a Nash equilibrium. Using
the terminology of Maskin and Sjöström (2002), c is an awkward outcome
for agent i in LCi(; a). In the canonical mechanism, given message m 2M
with mi = (a; ; ) for all i 2 N and a 2 f(), the attainable set from Rule
1 is LCi(; a) for each i 2 N . When f violates no-veto power, the planner
should restrict the attainable sets by removing awkward alternatives. For
all i 2 N , the (personalized) attainable sets Ci(; a); as dened in section
3, should be constructed. In Rule 2, for each  2  and each a 2 f(),
one should replace LCi(; a) by Ci(; a) for each i 2 N . In the environ-
ment considered by Maskin, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for Nash
implementation via a deterministic mechanism is strong monotonicity.7 In-
deed, strong monotonicity implies Maskin monotonicity but the converse is
not true. However, Maskin monotonicity together with no-veto power imply
strong monotonicity.
6A similar discussion can be found in the excellent survey of Maskin and Sjöström
(2002, Section 3.3). We follow here their terminology.
7See Maskin and Sjöström (2002) for a more detailed discussion of strong monotonicity.
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By considering a larger class of mechanisms that we call lottery mecha-
nisms, each agent is attainable set needs only be LCi(; a). The planner
does not need to construct personalized attainable sets by removing every
awkward outcome.
To illustrate our approach, we consider an important example fromMaskin
(1985, 1999) of a SCC that isMaskin monotonic, but does not satisfy no-veto
power. We use it here to show that this particular SCC is implementable in
Nash equilibrium if the planner uses a lottery mechanism. Thus, checking
whether the SCC satises Maskin monotonicity is enough to know if it is
Nash implementable.
Example 1 (Maskin, 1985 and 1999):
N  f1; 2; 3g,   f; g andA  fa; b; cg. The preferences are described
below.
 
1 2 3 1 2 3
b a a b c c
a c c c a a
c b b a b b
The SCC is described as follows. Given 0 2 , (i) if a majority prefers a
to b then a 2 f(0); (ii) if a majority prefers b to a, then b 2 f (0); and (iii)
c 2 f(0) if LCi (0; c) = A for each i 2 N . This SCC is Maskin monotonic
but does not satisfy no-veto power. It is thus not Nash implementable by
Maskins mechanism. In this example, f() = fag = f (). Observe that
LC1 (; a) = LC1(; c) = fa; cg and LCi (; c) = A for each i 2 N n f1g.
Hence, alternative c is an awkward outcome in LC1(; a). In Maskins mech-
anism, if the true state is , then the prole of messages m 2 M , with
mj = (a; ; ) for j 6= 1 and m1 = (c; ; ) is a Nash equilibrium. Rule 2
prescribes the outcome c =2 f().
Clearly, what needs to be modied is Rule 2. Instead of the outcome
being c, suppose Rule 2 gives a lottery (1  ") a + "c, with " 2 (0; 1). By
monotonicity in probabilities, when the true state is , agents 2 and 3 would
rather get c with probability one than a lottery on a and c. Therefore, when
the true state is , the prole m 2 M , with mj = (a; ; ) for j 6= 1 and
m1 = (c; ; ) is no longer a Nash equilibrium.
We have just informally shown that we can, on the one hand, dispense
with no-veto power, and on the other hand, that we do not need to construct
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restricted attainable sets. In fact, with linear orderings, we only need to check
whether a SCC is Maskin monotonic to know if it is Nash implementable.
Having possibly non-degenerate lotteries in Rule 2 eliminates the need for
no-veto power. Moreover, in the necessary and su¢ cient condition for Nash
implementation, only Maskin monotonicity will have bite.8
Before stating the main result, it may be worth mentioning that the next
theorem can be understood using the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
Nash implementation applied to the feasible set L. Notice that no completely
mixed lottery in the probability simplex can be awkward because (n  1)
players cannot have a top alternative there. The only di¤erence between
the attainable sets being LCi or Ci is only on the boundary of the simplex.
But then continuity of preferences implies the equivalence between strong
monotonicity and Maskin monotonicity. We are now ready to state our
result.
Theorem 2 If n  3 and preferences satisfy strictness and monotonicity
in probabilities, any SCC is implementable in Nash equilibrium by a lottery
mechanism if and only if it is Maskin monotonic.9
Proof: We rst prove that if f is implementable by a lottery mechanism,
then f is Maskin monotonic. If f is implementable in Nash equilibrium
by a lottery mechanism, there exists a mechanism (M; g) that implements it.
Consider  2  and a 2 f(). Since f is implemented, there ism 2 NE(G; )
such that g(m) = a. Hence, for each i 2 N , aRi () g(m0i;m i) for allm0i 2Mi
and for all  2  (). Because the equilibrium condition should hold for all
 2  (), we obtain that for each i 2 N , for each m0i 2 Mi, aRi () b
for all b 2suppg(m0i;m i). Suppose there exists  2  with a =2 f().
Implementation of f requires m =2 NE(G; ). Hence, there is i 2 N and
m0i 2Mi such that g(m0i;m i)Pi()a for some  2 (). By monotonicity in
probabilities, there exists at least one b 2 suppg(m0i;m i) such that bPi()a.
Since m is a Nash equilibrium under  for all  2  (), it is the case that
aRi()b. Therefore, f is Maskin monotonic.
8It is clear from the proof of Theorem 1 that unanimity is needed in Rule 3 of Maskins
mechanism. In Theorem 2, we show that unanimity can also be dropped by modifying
Rule 3 of Maskins mechanism.
9Alternatively, we could also drop the restriction to ordinal game forms. By dropping
this assumption, one can look at a richer set of SCCs that uses cardinal information; i.e.
f :    L. In that case, any cardinal SCC is implementable in Nash equilibrium by a
lottery mechanism if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (in the simplex).
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We now prove the su¢ ciency part. We construct the following (ordinal)
lottery mechanism.10 The message space of each agent i 2 N is Mi  A 
AN. A typical message is mi  (m1i ;m2i ;m3i ;m4i )  (x; ; a; ni). Fix a
number " 2 (0; 1).
Rule 1 : If mi =
 
x; ; a; :

for all i 2 N and x 2 f(), then g(m) = x.
Rule 2 : If mj =
 
x; ; a;  for each j 6= i, x 2 f() and mi = (c; ; b; )
with (c; ; b) 6=  x; ; a, then the outcome is
g(m) =

(1  )x+ b if b 2 LCi(; x)
x otherwise
Rule 3 : In all other cases, the outcome is (1  1
1+ni
)a + 1
1+ni
b if mi =
(a; ; b; ni), where i = min fi 2 N : ni  nj 8j 2 Ng, and a 6= b. Otherwise
if a = b, the outcome is the lottery that assigns equal weights on all the
alternatives in A.
We show that this game form Nash implements any SCC f that isMaskin
monotonic.
First, suppose that the true prole is  and that x 2 f(). The message
prole m 2 M with mi = (x; ; x; 0) for each i 2 N is a Nash Equilibrium
of G. By unilaterally deviating, an agent i 2 N can only trigger Rule 2 and
obtain either x with probability 1 or a lottery on x and another alternative b 2
LCi(; x). In that case, the deviation decreases the probability of x 2 f()
and increases the probability of a worse alternative b 2 A. By monotonicity
in probabilities, this deviation is not protable. Therefore, m is a Nash
equilibrium.
Second, suppose the true state is  2 . We now show that for each
 2 (), g(NE(G; ))  f(). We have three cases to consider.
1) g(m) is given by Rule 3.
We show that there are no equilibrium. If a 6= b, the outcome is g(m) =
(1   1
1+ni
)a + 1
1+ni
b. By strictness and monotonicity in probabilities, even
10The mechanism uses an integer game. This has been the object of many criticisms
see for instance Jackson (1992). The device in Rule 3 works because the set of protable
deviations is open. If such constructions are to be avoided, then the theorem may hold
only for unanimous SCCs. Moreover, Jackson (1992) shows that restricting the class of
mechanisms may have a severe impact on the class of implementable SCCs. There is no
presumption that the su¢ ciency result here or in Maskin (1999) can be replicated using
well-behavedmechanisms.
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if agents agree on the ranking of a and bwith a being top-rankedany agent
i 2 N could announce m0i = (a; ; b; n0i) with n0i > ni in order to give more
weight to a and relatively less weight to b. Next, if the outcome g(m) is the
uniform distribution over alternatives, again by strictness and monotonicity
in probabilities, any agent i 2 N would deviate to m0i = (a; ; b; n0i), with
a 6= b, n0i > ni, aPi()b and bPi()c for each c 6= a, in order to obtain a
lottery restricted to two alternatives.
2) g(m) is given by Rule 2
If g(m) is obtained by Rule 2, note that any agent j 6= i could deviate
by announcing m0j with (m
10
j ;m
20
j ;m
30
j ) 6=
 
x; ; a

and n0j > nk for all k 6= j,
trigger Rule 3 and obtain a lottery on his two top alternatives under .
We have two cases to consider. In the rst case, g(m) 2 L and supp(g(m)) =
fa 2 A : xa > 0g is not a singleton. Because preferences are strict, for each
agent, any non-degenerate lottery is dominated by a lottery on the two top
alternatives with su¢ ciently high weight placed on the top alternative. Un-
der Rule 3, for any j 6= i this is obtained by reporting a su¢ ciently large n0j.
Hence, g(m) is not a Nash equilibrium.
In the second case, g(m) = x is a degenerate lottery. Suppose that x
is a Nash equilibrium outcome for  chosen by Rule 2. Agent i can prof-
itably deviate by reporting (c0; 0; b0; ) 6=  x; ; a if b0 2 LCi(; x) and
((1  ) x+ b0)Pi()x for  2 (). Because preferences over lotteries are
monotone in probabilities, such a protable deviation does not exist if xRi()b0
for all b0 2 LCi(; x). Thus, LCi(; x)  LCi(; x). Moreover, if no agent
j 6= i has a protable deviation, then LCj(; x) = A. Thus, LCj(; x) 
LCj(; x) for all j 6= i. By Maskin monotonicity, x 2 f().
3) g(m) is given by Rule 1.
If  is announced truthfully, then the outcome lies in f() by Rule 1.
Suppose instead that each i 2 N announces mi = (x; ; a; ) with  6=  and
x 2 f(). To complete the proof, it is su¢ cient to show that LCi (; x) 
LCi (; x) for all i 2 N because it would then follow fromMaskin monotonic-
ity that x 2 f ().
On the contrary, suppose that there exists an i 2 N and b 2 LCi (; x)
such that bPi ()x: By deviating, agent i can obtain (1  )x+b. In order for
this deviation not to be protable, it must be the case that xRi () ((1  )x+
b) for all  2  (). By monotonicity in probabilities, this contradicts the
assumption that bPi ()x.
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Q.E.D.
Remark. Given the results on virtual implementation in Abreu and
Sen (1990) or Abreu and Matsushima (1992), one could hope that the use
of lotteries would relax the necessary condition for Nash implementation.
Theorem 2 shows that enlarging the range of the mechanism from A to
L closes the gap between Maskin monotonicity and Nash implementability,
provided that preferences satisfy strictness and monotonicity in probabilities.
Since the focus is not on approximate but on exact Nash implementation,
Maskin monotonicity remains necessary.
Abreu and Matsushima (1994) show that any stochastic social choice
function can be exactly implemented in iteratively weakly undominated strate-
gies. However, the existence of small nes that can be levied on players and
their assumption that agents have a nite set of preferences satisfying the
Von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms are crucial to their result.
4 Discussion
4.1 Relaxing strictness of preferences
If strictness is not satised, the mechanism used to establish Theorem 2 may
generate bad equilibria. For instance, suppose that in Rule 3, the outcome is
(1  1
1+ni
)a+ 1
1+ni
b and alternatives a and b are both top-ranked for every
agent. Since f is deterministic, (1   1
ni
)a + 1
ni
b would be an undesirable
equilibrium outcome. The same thing happens if the outcome is (1  )x+ b
determined by Rule 2.
In order to circumvent this problem, we need an additional restriction on
the environment. One such restriction is the following.
Top strict di¤erence: For each  2 , and for each a 2 A such that
LCi (; a) = A for at least (n  1) agents i 2 N , there exist j; k 2 N for
whom TOPj() = TOPk() = fag.
This rules out the undesirable equilibrium outcomes in Rule 2 and Rule
3 of the mechanism used in Theorem 2. To see this, suppose that  2  is
the true state, and that (1 )x+b is the outcome of the game following the
report of the message prolem 2M . If LCj (; b) = A for each j but possibly
i 2 N , top strict di¤erence guarantees that at least one such j is such that
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TOPj() = fbg, and therefore guarantees that a protable deviation exists:
agent j can trigger the integer game by announcing the highest integer and
obtain a preferred lottery. Moreover, if an outcome is determined by Rule 3,
again top strict di¤erence rules it out as an equilibrium outcome: there, it is
enough to have one agent for whom the set of top alternatives is a singleton.
4.2 SCCs with private components
SCCs with private components violating no-veto power includeamong others
the core correspondence, the individually rational correspondence (hence-
forth the IR correspondence) in the assignment of indivisible goods and the
stable rule in matching problems. For all these rules, Theorem 1 does not
allow one to check whether or not they are Nash implementable.
The message of Theorem 2 and the discussion that followed is that, given
some mild domain restrictions, any Maskin monotonic SCC is Nash imple-
mentable by a lottery mechanism. When strictness is satised, this result
extends to environments where alternatives are vectors with private compo-
nents.11 However, when indi¤erences are introduced, it is important to note
that a lottery mechanism in the way we have dened it in Theorem 2 will
not work. First, top strict di¤erence needs to be redened. From now on,
for each a 2 A, let a = (a1; :::; an).
Top strict di¤erence for private components: For each  2 , and
each a 2 A such that ai 2 TOPi() for at least (n  1) agents, there exists
j; k 2 N for whom TOPj() =

a0 : a0j = aj
	
and TOPk() = fa0 : a0k = akg.
If top strict di¤erence for private components is satised, when there are
private components, Maskin monotonic SCCs are not implementable by the
lottery mechanism we have constructed in Theorem 2. To see this, let us
look at an example for the assignment of indivisible goods without monetary
transfers.
Example 2: Assignment of indivisible objects and the individually ra-
tional rule.
N  f1; 2; 3; 4g. There are four objects a1; a2, a3 and a4. The initial
endowment !i of each agent i 2 N is the object ai. An allocation is an
11Notice that in Rule 2 the requirement b 2 LCi(; a) should be read as bi 2 LCi(; ai).
In Rule 3, the requirement a 6= b should be read ai 6= bi .
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assignment of indivisible objects, one to each agent. Formally, an assignment
is a bijection  : N ! A. Let Z be the set of assignments. The IR rule is a
correspondence such that for each  2 , f() = f 2 Z : iRi()!i for each
i 2 Ng. Consider the following preferences over objects.
 
1 2 3 4
a1 a2 a3 a4 a3 a4
a2 a1 a1 a2
a3 a3 a2 a1
a4 a4
1 2 3 4
a1 a2 a1 a3
a2 a1 a3 a2 a4
a4 a3 a4 a1
a3 a4 a3
The selection operated by f is f() = f(a1; a2; a3; a4) ; (a1; a2; a4; a3)g,
and f() = f(a1; a2; a3; a4)g. Notice that f violates no-veto power because
the allocation (a1; a2; a4; a3) is excluded when the state is . Moreover, f
is not Nash implementable by a version of the mechanism in Theorem 2
even though top strict di¤erence for private components is satised. Let
a = (a1; a2; a3; a4) and a0 = (a1; a2; a4; a3). Consider the case where the
true state is  and the message m with mj = (a; ; a0; ) for j = 2; 3; 4 and
m1 = (; ; a0; ) has been reported. The outcome is g(m) = (1  ) a + a0,
which is a Nash equilibrium outcome under , in contradiction with the Nash
implementation of f . The problem does not come from the violation of no-
veto power but merely from the fact that top strict di¤erence is vacuous.
Agents 1 and 2 meet the restriction imposed by top strict di¤erence for
private components but they receive the same object in both allocations.
Observe that it is crucial that the number of agents be at least four. With
three agents, this problem is never encountered.
As a consequence, the mechanism has to be further complicated. For
instance, in Rule 2, if g(m) 2 L; then among the (n 1) agents j 6= i, it should
be the case that at least one is not indi¤erent between both components he
receives.12
12Rule 3 has to be modied in a similar fashion. One such modication is the following:
Rule 3.1 : In all other cases, the outcome is (1  11+ni )a+
1
1+ni
b if mi = (a; ; b; ni),
where i = min

i 2 N : ni  nj 8j 2 N	, ai 6= bi and aj 6= bj for each j 6= i. Oth-
erwise, the outcome is the lottery that assigns equal weights on all the alternatives in
A.
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Rule 2.1: Ifmj = (x; ; a; :) for each j 6= i, x 2 f() andmi = (c; ; b; ) 6=
mj, then the outcome is g(m) = (1  )x+ b if,
1) bi 6= xi, bi 2 LCi(; xi) and,
2) there is j 6= i such that fxj; bjg * TOPj ()
Otherwise, g(m) = x.
Once specic forms of indi¤erences are allowed, lottery mechanims be-
come more complex. In Rule 2.1, the attainable set of agent i is restricted
because some alternatives may be removed from LCi (; xi). Because of top
strict di¤erence with private components, this restriction imposes no con-
straints on deviations.13
5 Application: voluntary implementation
Our approach is not restricted only to Maskins Theorem. In a recent article,
Jackson and Palfrey (2001) consider voluntary implementation. The problem
related to the enforceability of the outcome function out of equilibrium is
studied. Agents are not forced to accept the outcome of the mechanism,
and can veto some subset of the set of alternatives. For instance, a state-
contingent participation constraint denes a mapping from outcomes vetoed
by agents into individually rational outcomes.
First, we need to introduce some additional denitions.14 Let F be the
set of all social choice functions over A. A reversion function is a mapping
h : ! A that indicates what the outcome is in the case of a veto by at least
one individual. A reversion function h induces a mapping H : AF by
H(a; ; h) =

a if aRi()h() for each i 2 N
h() otherwise
Given a game form (M; g), a message prole m is an h-Nash equilibrium of
(M; g) at  if for each agent i 2 N ,
H(g(m); ; h)Ri()H(g(m
0
i;m i); ; h) 8m0i 2Mi.
13Obviously, allowing indi¤erencesbut requiring that for each  2 , TOPj() is unique
for at least (n  1) agentsexcludes the complication underlined in example 2.
14We follow the notation introduced by Jackson and Palfrey (2001).
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A SCC f is h-Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism (M; g) such
that, for all  2 :
(1) For each a 2 f(), there exists an h-Nash equilibrium, m 2M , such
that H(g(m); ; h) = a.
(2) If m 2M is an h-Nash equilibrium at , then H(g(m); ; h) 2 f().
An analog to Maskin monotonicity is derived. A SCC f is reversion-
monotonic relative to h if for each  2 , and each a 2 f(), there exists
z 2 A such that
1. H(z; ; h) = a.
2. For all  2  such that H(z; ; h) =2 f(), there exists y 2 A and
i 2 N such that H(z; ; h)Ri()H(y; ; h) and H(y; ; h)Pi()H(z; ; h).
Reversion monotonicity is indeed necessary for h-Nash implementation.
Coupled with h no-veto power, it is also su¢ cient, provided n  3.
A SCC f satises h-no-veto power if for each (a; ) 2 A  , and each
i 2 N ,
[H(a; ; h)Rj()H(b; ; h) for each j 6= i and each b 2 A] =) [H(a; ; h) 2 f()].
A SCC f satises h-unanimity if for each (a; ) 2 A,
[H(a; ; h)Ri ()H(b; ; h) for each i 2 N and each b 2 A] =) [H(a; ; h) 2 f()].
Again, h no-veto power is not necessary for h-Nash implementation. An
interesting feature of the voluntary implementation approach is that it is pos-
sible to construct non-Maskin monotonic SCCs that are, given h, reversion-
monotonic relative to h. We construct an example of such a SCC that also
violates h no-veto power. It is a variant of an example of Jackson and Pal-
frey (2001).15 The example is as follows:
Example 3: N  f1; 2; 3g, A  fa; b; c; dg and   f; g. The status-
quo is c. The reversion function is constant across states and equal to the
status-quo, that is h() = c for each  2 . The function H maps out-
comes that are not individually rational to the status-quo. Hence, we want
to perform IR-Nash implementation. The preferences over alternatives are
described as follows.
15The SCC in their example satises h NV P .
16
 
1 2 3 1 2 3
a b d d b d
d d a a d a
b a c b a b
c c b c c c
Consider the non-Maskin monotonic SCC f , with f() = fa; dg and
f() = fag. This SCC is reversion-monotonic relative to h. We show that
agent 2 experiences a preference reversal relative to h when going from  to
. Since alternative d is individually rational for every agent, H(d; ; h) =
H(d; ; h) = d. However, for alternative b, by cP3()b, we obtain that
H(b; ; h) = c. Moreover, H(b; ; h) = b. Thus,
H(d; ; h)R2()H(b; ; h) and H(b; ; h)P2()H(d; ; h); or
dR2()c and bP2()d
Finally, it is easy to see that f does not satisfy h   no-veto power. For
agent 1 and 3, LC1(;H(d; ; h)) = LC3(;H(d; ; h)) = A but H(d; ; h) =
d =2 f().
We can state the following Theorem.
Theorem 3: If n  3 and preferences satisfy strictness and monotonicity
in probablilities, any SCC satisfying h-unanimity is h-implementable by a
lottery mechanism if and only if it is reversion monotonic relative to h.
Proof : The necessity part is omitted and can be adapted from Jackson
and Palfrey (2001).
For the su¢ ciency part, we construct the following mechanism. The
message space of each agent i 2 N is Mi  A    A  N. A typical
message will be denoted mi  (m1i ;m2i ;m3i ;m4i )  (x; ; a; ni). Fix a number
" 2 (0; 1). The outcome function is described as follows:
Rule 1 : If mi =
 
x; ; a; :

for all i 2 N , H(x; ; h) 2 f() and x satises
2) in the denition of reversion monotonicity, then g(m) = x.
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Rule 2 : If mj =
 
x; ; a; :

for each j 6= i, H(x; ; h) 2 f(), x satises 2)
in the denition of reversion monotonicity andmi = (c; ; b; ) with (c; ; b) 6= 
x; ; a

, then the outcome is
g(m) =

(1  )x+ b if H(b; ; h) 2 LCi(;H(x; ; h))
x otherwise
Rule 3 : In all other cases, the outcome is a determined bymi = (a; ; ; ni),
where i = min fi 2 N : ni  nj 8j 2 Ng.
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2 and is thus omitted.
Q.E.D.
The assumption of strict preferences can be relaxed, as before. If the
SCC is on alternatives with private components, the discussion in Section
4.2 applies.
6 Concluding remarks
1) Extending the class of admissible mechanisms is useful for (exact) Nash
implementation. Theorem 2 closes the gap between Maskin monotonicity
and Nash implementability, provided that preferences are strict and satisfy
monotonicity in probabilities. Moreover, no restriction on the attainable sets
has to be constructed.
2) Theorem 2 extends to environments where strictness is relaxed to top
strict di¤erence. Neverthless, for environments with private consumption
sets or in matching problems, top strict di¤erence for private components is
vacuous. In such a case, restricted attainable sets have to be constructed for
each agent.
3) Lottery mechanisms can also be useful for alternative implementation
approaches. Vartiainen (2003) shows that if preferences are strict, one can
randomize out of equilibrium and drop the assumption of no-veto power
from the Theorem of Abreu and Sen (1990).16 We conjecture that similar
results could be obtained in incomplete information settings, for instance
with Bayesian implementation.17
16I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this paper.
17See for instance Jackson (1991) for a discussion of Bayesian implementation.
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4) A possible extension of this work would be to design simple lottery
mechanisms to implement SCCs violating no-veto power.
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Proposition 1: If n  3; and preferences satisfy top strict di¤erence and
monotonicity in probabilities, any SCC is Nash implementable by a lottery
mechanism if and only if it is Maskin monotonic:
Proof : The necessity part is omitted. It already appears in Theorem 2.
For the su¢ ciency part, we use the same mechanism constructed in Theorem
2.
The message space of each agent i 2 N isMi  AAN. A typical
message is mi  (m1i ;m2i ;m3i ;m4i )  (x; ; a; ni). Fix a number " 2 (0; 1).
Rule 1 : If mi =
 
x; ; a; :

for all i 2 N and x 2 f(), then g(m) = x.
Rule 2 : If mj =
 
x; ; a;  for each j 6= i, x 2 f() and mi = (c; ; b; )
with (c; ; b) 6=  x; ; a, then the outcome is
g(m) =

(1  )x+ b if b 2 LCi(; x)
x otherwise
Rule 3 : In all other cases, the outcome is

1  1
1+ni
a

+ 1
1+ni
b if mi =
(a; ; b; ni), where i = min fi 2 N : ni  nj 8j 2 Ng, and a 6= b. Otherwise
if a = b, the outcome is the lottery that assigns equal weights on all the
alternatives in A.
We show that this game form Nash implements any SCC f that isMaskin
monotonic.
First, suppose that the true prole is  and that x 2 f(). The message
prole m 2 M with mi = (x; ; x; 0) for each i 2 N is a Nash Equilibrium
of G. By unilaterally deviating, an agent i 2 N can only trigger Rule 2 and
obtain either x with probability 1 or a lottery on x and another alternative b 2
LCi(; x). In that case, the deviation decreases the probability of x 2 f()
and increases the probability of a worse alternative b 2 A. By monotonicity
in probabilities, this deviation is not protable. Therefore, m is a Nash
equilibrium.
Second, suppose the true state is  2 . We now show that for each
 2 (), g(NE(G; ))  f(). We have three cases to consider.
1) g(m) is given by Rule 3.
We show that there are no equilibrium. If a 6= b, the outcome is g(m) =
(1  1
1+ni
)a+ 1
1+ni
b. By top strict di¤erence, even if a 2 TOPj () for at least
(n  1) agents j, there exists an agent i for whom b =2 TOPi (). Such an
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agent i could announce m0i = (a; ; b; n0i) with n0i > ni in order to give more
weight to a and relatively less weight to b. By monotonicity in probabilities,
this is a protable deviation for agent i. The case where b 2 TOPj () for at
least (n  1) agents j is similar.
Next, if the outcome g(m) is the uniform distribution over alternatives,
again by top strict di¤erence and monotonicity in probabilities, some agent
i 2 N would deviate to m0i = (a; ; b; n0i), with a 6= b, n0i > ni, aRi()b
and bRi()c for each c 6= a, in order to obtain a lottery restricted to two
alternatives.
2) g(m) is given by Rule 2
If g(m) is obtained by Rule 2, note that any agent j 6= i could deviate
by announcing m0j with (m
10
j ;m
20
j ;m
30
j ) 6= (x; ; a) and n0j > nk for all k 6= j,
trigger Rule 3 and obtain a lottery on his two top alternatives under .
We have two cases to consider. In the rst case, g(m) 2 L and supp(g(m)) =
fa 2 A : xa > 0g is not a singleton. That is, g(m) = (1  )x+ b. Top strict
di¤erence guarantees that even if fx; bg  TOPk () for (n  1) agents k,
there exists j 6= i such that fx; bg * TOPj (). For such an agent j 2 N ,
g(m) is dominated by a lottery on the two top alternatives with su¢ ciently
high weight placed on the top alternative. Under Rule 3, for any j 6= i this
is obtained by reporting a su¢ ciently large n0j. Hence, g(m) is not a Nash
equilibrium.
In the second case, g(m) = x is a degenerate lottery. Suppose that
x is a Nash equilibrium outcome for  chosen by Rule 2. Agent i can
protably deviate by reporting (c0; 0; b0; ) 6=  x; ; a with b0 2 LCi(; x)
and ((1  ) x+ b0)Pi()x for  2 (). Because preferences over lotter-
ies are monotonic in probabilities, such a protable deviation does not exist
if xRi()b0 for all b0 2 LCi(; x). Thus, LCi(; x)  LCi(; x). Moreover,
if no agent j 6= i has a protable deviation, then LCj(; x) = A. Thus,
LCj(; x)  LCj(; x) for all j 6= i. By Maskin monotonicity, x 2 f().
3) g(m) is given by Rule 1.
If  is announced truthfully, then the outcome lies in f() by Rule 1.
Suppose instead that each i 2 N announces mi = (x; ; a; ) with  6=  and
x 2 f(). To complete the proof, it is su¢ cient to show that LCi (; x) 
LCi (; x) for all i 2 N because it would then follow fromMaskin monotonic-
ity that x 2 f ().
On the contrary, suppose that there exists an i 2 N and b 2 LCi (; x)
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such that bPi ()x: By deviating, agent i can obtain (1  )x+b. In order for
this deviation not to be protable, it must be the case that xRi () ((1  )x+
b) for all  2  (). By monotonicity in probabilities, this contradicts the
assumption that bPi ()x.
Q.E.D.
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Proposition 2: If n  3 and preferences satisfy top strict di¤erence for
private components and monotonicity in probabilities, any SCC with private
components is Nash implementable by a lottery mechanism if and only if it
is Maskin monotonic
Proof : The necessity part is omitted. It already appears in Theorem 2.
For the su¢ ciency part, we use the following mechanism.
The message space of each agent i 2 N isMi  AAN. A typical
message is mi  (m1i ;m2i ;m3i ;m4i )  (x; ; a; ni). Fix a number " 2 (0; 1).
Rule 1 : If mi =
 
x; ; a; :

for all i 2 N and x 2 f(), then g(m) = x.
Rule 2.1: If mj =
 
x; ; a; :

for each j 6= i, x 2 f() and mi = (c; ; b; )
with (c; ; b) 6=  x; ; a, then the outcome is g(m) = (1  )x+ b if,

1) bi 6= xi, b0i 2 LCi(; xi) and,
2) there is j 6= i such that fxj; bjg * TOPj ()
Otherwise, g(m) = x.
Rule 3.1 : In all other cases, the outcome is (1  1
1+ni
)a+ 1
1+ni
b if mi =
(a; ; b; ni), where i = min fi 2 N : ni  nj 8j 2 Ng, ai 6= bi and aj 6= bj
for each j 6= i. Otherwise, the outcome is the lottery that assigns equal
weights on all the alternatives in A.
We show that this game form Nash implements any SCC with private
components f that is Maskin monotonic.
First, suppose that the true prole is  and that x 2 f(). The message
prole m 2 M with mi = (x; ; x; 0) for each i 2 N is a Nash Equilibrium
of G. By unilaterally deviating, an agent i 2 N can only trigger Rule 2 and
obtain either xi with probability 1 or a lottery on xi and another alternative
bi 2 LCi(; xi). In that case, the deviation decreases the probability of
x 2 f() and increases the probability of a worse alternative b 2 A. By
monotonicity in probabilities, this deviation is not protable. Therefore, m
is a Nash equilibrium.
Second, suppose the true state is  2 . We now show that for each
 2 (), g(NE(G; ))  f(). We have three cases to consider.
1) g(m) is given by Rule 3.
We show that there are no equilibrium. Suppose rst that the outcome
is g(m) = (1  1
1+ni
)a+ 1
1+ni
b. We have three cases to consider.
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a) fakg  TOPk () for (n  1) agents k. By top strict di¤erence for
private components, there exists an agent i 2 N for whom TOPi () = fa0{ :
a0i = aig.
Since aj 6= bj for each j 2 N;such an agent i could announce m0i =
(a; ; b; n0i) with n0i > ni in order to give more weight to a and relatively less
weight to b. By monotonicity in probabilities, this is a protable deviation
for agent i.
b) fbkg  TOPk () for (n  1) agents k. By top strict di¤erence for
private components, there exists an agent i 2 N for whom TOPi () = fb0{ :
b0i = big:
Since aj 6= bj for each j 2 N; such an agent i could announce m0i =
(b; ; a; n0i) with n0i > ni in order to give more weight to b and relatively less
weight to a. By monotonicity in probabilities, this is a protable deviation
for agent i.
c) fai; big  TOPi () for some i 2 N . By top strict di¤erence
for private components, there exists an agent j 6= i for whom faj; bjg *
TOPj () : Such an agent j could announce m0j = (c; ; d; n0i) with n0j > ni,
cj 6= dj, cjRj()dj and djRj () ej for all ej 6= cj, and such that ck 6= dk for
each k 6= j. By monotonicity in probabilities, this is a protable deviation
for agent i.
Next, if the outcome g(m) is the uniform distribution over alternatives,
again by top strict di¤erence for private components and monotonicity in
probabilities, some agent i 2 N would deviate to m0i = (a; ; b; n0i), with
ai 6= bi, aj 6= bj for each j 6= i, n0i > ni, aiRi()bi and biRi()ci for each
ci 6= ai, in order to obtain a lottery restricted on two alternatives.
2) g(m) is given by Rule 2
If g(m) is obtained by Rule 2, note that any agent j 6= i could deviate
by announcing m0j with (m
10
j ;m
20
j ;m
30
j ) 6=
 
x; ; a

and n0j > nk for all k 6= j,
trigger Rule 3 and obtain a lottery on his two top alternatives under .
We have two cases to consider. In the rst case, g(m) 2 L and supp(g(m)) =
fa 2 A : xa > 0g is not a singleton. That is, g(m) = (1  )x+ b. Top strict
di¤erence for private components guarantees that even if fxk; bkg  TOPk ()
for (n  1) agents k, there exists j 6= i such that fxj; bjg * TOPj (). For
such an agent j, g(m) is dominated by a lottery on the two top alternatives
with su¢ ciently high weight placed on the top alternative. Under Rule 3, for
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any j 6= i this is obtained by reporting a su¢ ciently large n0j. Hence, g(m)
is not a Nash equilibrium.
In the second case, g(m) = x is a degenerate lottery. Suppose that
x is a Nash equilibrium outcome for  chosen by Rule 2. Agent i can
protably deviate by reporting (c0; 0; b0) 6=  x; ; a if b0i 2 LCi(; xi) and
((1  ) xi + b0i)Pi()xi for  2 (). Because preferences over lotteries
are monotone in probabilities, such a protable deviation does not exist if
xiRi()b
0
i for all b
0
i 2 LCi(; xi). Thus, LCi(; xi)  LCi(; xi). Moreover,
if no agent j 6= i has a protable deviation, then xj 2 TOPj (). Thus,
LCj(; xj)  LCj(; xj) for all j 6= i. By Maskin monotonicity, x 2 f().
3) g(m) is given by Rule 1.
If  is announced truthfully, then the outcome lies in f() by Rule 1.
Suppose instead that each i 2 N announces mi = (x; ; a; ) with  6=  and
x 2 f(). To complete the proof, it is su¢ cient to show that LCi (; xi) 
LCi (; xi) for all i 2 N because it would then follow fromMaskin monotonic-
ity that x 2 f ().
On the contrary, suppose that there exists an i 2 N and bi 2 LCi (; xi)
such that biPi ()xi: By deviating, agent i can obtain (1  )xi+bi. In order
for this deviation not to be protable, it must be the case that xiRi () ((1  )xi+
bi) for all  2  (). By monotonicity in probabilities, this contradicts the
assumption that biPi ()xi.
Q.E.D.
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Proposition 3: If n  3 and preferences satisfy strictness and monotonic-
ity in probabilities, any SCC satisfying h-unanimity is h implementable by
a lottery mechanism if and only if it is reversion monotonic relative to h.
Proof : The necessary part is omitted. The message space of each agent
i 2 N is Mi  A    A  N. A typical message will be denoted mi 
(m1i ;m
2
i ;m
3
i ;m
4
i )  (x; ; a; ni). Fix a number " 2 (0; 1). The outcome
function is described as follows:
Rule 1 : If mi =
 
x; ; a; :

for all i 2 N; H(x; ; h) 2 f() and x satises
2) in the denition of reversion monotonicity, then g(m) = x.
Rule 2 : If mj =
 
x; ; a; :

for each j 6= i, H(x; ; h) 2 f(), x satises
2) in the denition of reversion monotonicity and mi = (c; ; b; ni) with
(c; ; b) 6=  x; ; a , then the outcome is
g(m) =

(1  )x+ b if H(b; ; h) 2 LCi(;H(x; ; h))
x otherwise
Rule 3 : In all other cases, the outcome is a given by mi = (a; ; ; ni),
where i = min fi 2 N : ni  nj 8j 2 Ng.
First, suppose that the true prole is  and that, given h, there ex-
ists x such that H(x; ; h) 2 f(). The message prole m 2 M with
mi = (x; ; x; 0) for each i 2 N is a Nash Equilibrium of G. By unilat-
erally deviating, an agent i 2 N can only trigger Rule 2 and obtain either
H(x; ; h) with probability 1 or a lottery on H(x; ; h) and another alter-
native H(b; ; h) 2 LCi(;H(x; ; h)). In that case, the deviation decreases
the probability of H(x; ; h) 2 f() and increases the probability of a worse
alternative H(b; ; h) 2 A. By monotonicity in probabilities, this deviation is
not protable. Therefore, m is a Nash equilibrium.
Second, suppose the true state is  2 . We now show that for each
 2 (), g(NE(G; ))  f(). We have three cases to consider.
1) g(m) is given by Rule 3
Any agent i could deviate by announcing ni > ni and cause the outcome
function to choose any outcome in A. If for all agent i 2 N such a deviation
does not exist, this implies that for each i 2 N , H(g(m); ; h)Ri()H(y; ; h)
for all y 2 A. By h-unanimity of f , this implies that H(g(m); ; h) 2 f().
2) g(m) is given by Rule 2
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We have two cases to consider. In the rst case, g(m) 2 L, supp(g(m))
is not a singleton and H(x; ; h) 6= H(b; ; h). By strictness, any agent j 6= i
could deviate by triggering Rule 3 and obtain, with probability one, the
alternative he prefers between H(x; ; h) and H(b; ; h). Hence, g(m) is not
a Nash equilibrium.
In the second case, either g(m) = x, or H(x; ; h) = H(b; ; h). Sup-
pose that g(m) is a Nash equilibrium outcome under : Then, it is the
case that H(x; ; h) 2 f(). Otherwise, by the denition of reversion-
monotonicity, there would exist an agent k 2 N and y 2 A such that
H(y; ; h) 2 LCk
 
;H(x; ; h

and H(y; ; h)Pk()H(x; ; h).
1) g(m) is given by Rule 1
If  is announced truthfully, then H(g(m); ; h) 2 f() by Rule 1. So
suppose instead that each i 2 N announces mi = (x; ; a; ) with  6=  and
H(x; ; h) 2 f().
Then, it is the case that H(x; ; h) 2 f(). Otherwise, by the denition
of reversion-monotonicity, there would exist an agent i 2 N and y 2 A such
that H(y; ; h) 2 LCi (;H(x; ; h)) and H(y; ; h)Pi()H(x; ; h).
Q.E.D.
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